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176 'Roy v. SALISBURY [21 C.2d' 
F.urthermore~ it bas· been held that defects in certificates of 
tax s,alcs may be cUred by retr,oactivc legislation. (Stanton v. ' 
Hotc,ikislJ,157,CaL 65~ [108 P; 8?4J ; Fox v. Townsenq" supra; 
Ba1~kofLem'oq'1'Cv.fJulgham; 151 Cal. 234 [90 P. 936] ; Baird 
v.',ll(Qnroe.Jl)p,CIll. 560 [~9 P. 352] ; Carter v. Osborn, 150 
Ca1.,620 [89 P'.~081.) The curative provisions in the ordinance 
itself serve tliatpurpose. ' 
, "For 'tb.~ forego~ 'rea~ons I, think the judgment should ,be 
affirmed. " 
'Edmonds, J., concurred. 
, , 
,~> ',' '- ,"',,':' \, ", ",' '-,' 
:ij 1 J!4:c~Dj.g. ,l!o,e~~r~*es: [1, 2] Contractli, § 281 ;[3, 6] Contracts, 
§1,~3a; [41~li-~4s,~~atute of,§ 4; [5] Frauds, l?tatute of, § 49; 
,[1], Contract,s,'§:l12; [81. ContraCts, §§ 150, 152; '[9] Decedents' 
'Estatcs,'§578;-[10] ~ppeal andError,§1569 • 
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was referring t~ his ill health and that he had both contingen-
cies ininind. (See Civ. Code, § 1649.) 
Frauds, f:itatute of~Agreements Not ;Performed in Lifetime • ...;;. 
An oral contract for the care of a dog, is not invalid under 
Code Civ. Proc., § 1973,subd. 6, andCiv. Code, § 1624, subd. 6, 
wh,ere as one alternative it contemplates care during the own-
er's ill health and thus admits of performance during his life-
time. 
[5~ Id.-Operation-"-Oontract Partly Within Statute.-Where one 
part of a contract is capable of performance within the own-
er's lifetime and is thus not within the statute of frauds, and 
where such performance may constitute also a performance of 
the other part of the contract which is withiD the statute, the 
contract may not be condemned. Further, where a contract 
contains alternative promises, as where it relates to plj,yment 
for care of a dog if the owner dies or if he becomes incapaci-
tated, and where one of the. promises is within the statute and 
the other is not, recovery may be had for the breach oUhe latter. 
[6a,6b] 'Oontracts--::SubjecU\[atter-Oare of Dog.-A contract for 
the care of a dog if the owner "should become unable to care;' 
tor it waS properly constl1led as referring to his illness in 
view of the owner's discussion of his ill health in connection 
. with the translj,ction, and it was not, therefore, fatally uncer-
'tain. . 
['1] Id.~Oertainty.-Courts lean against destruction of contracts 
. 'because of uncertainty, and,' if ,feasable, construe them ,SQ as 
to carry out the, reasonable intentions of the parties if that 
cu.il: beasce,rtained. 
[81 Id.-interpretation-By Parties.-The practical construction 
ofa contract made by the parties is cogent evidence of their 
intent. Hence, any uncertainty a,s toa provision for care of 
a dog, while th,e owner is "unable" to care for. it is removed 
where the dog is delivered pursuant to the' contract during the, 
owner's illness. 
[9] Decedents; Estates--::Olaims--::Testimony of Parties or Assign-
or~Assigument.":'-An instrument e:l\:ecuted by a married 
woman subsequent to the execution ofa contract and the death 
of the promisor and re~iting· an agreement that the claim 
against the estate of the promisor is the separate property of 
h.er husband, is not an assignment within Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1880, subd. 3, but a recognition of an established status of 
[4]8ee 12 Oal.Jur. 857. 
[5] , See 25 B..O.L. 703. 
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~T:We"-pr~pe~Fy;'~nd, the wife is competent as a witnes~in sup-
.,' ":¥,ort of her h1isblUl.d'sclaim~ 
,[lO]Appeal~l[armless' and Reversible Error-Evidence-Facts 
:~;'Ot~~~e>~~tab~Shed.-:-Anyerrbr in . permitting a wife' to 
,,' testify ill support of her hlisband'sactlon oli a claim against 
." an estate was notprejudicili.l where the trial was before the 
,'" , coUrt 'and there was sufficient independent evidence to sup-
, port the judgment. 
. APPEAL from a jud~ent of the Superior Court of Ala-
meda Oounty. James G. Quinn,' Judge. Affirmed. ' 
i'ActioIi on claim against an estate. Judgment for plaintiff 
affirnled. ' , ," ' 
Raymond Salisbury in pro. per., and Joseph C. Prior ,for 
Appellant. 
Fitzgerald, Abbott & Beardsley and Milton W. D~brzensky 
'for 'Respondent. 
CARTER, J. -:-Defendant, as 'executor of the estate of 
Edward S. Drucks, deceased, appeals from a money judg-
ment in favor of plaintiff upon a rejected probate claim. 
, Plaintiff, the owner of the Palanka Kennels and a breeder 
and trainer of Doberman Pinscher dogs, sold a pup of that 
breed named Mike to the decedent, Dr. Drucks. It appears 
that decedent had a great affection for Mike and employed 
plaintiff to train him. Decedent knew that plaintiff's usual 
,rate for boar,ding and caring for Doberman Pinschers was 
:~20 pe: month, having pai~ that amount to plaintiff for keep-
pl,g: ,MIke on ,several occaSI()ns. The trial court found that 
~~~~ oral, contra~t between decedent and plaintiff, which is 
the basis of plaintiff's claim against decedtmt's estate, was 
as follows: ' 
" H~hat if said' Drucks ever became unable to care for 
~a~d dog, qr, nhe should die, he had arranged that said 
~';M:IKE" would be delivered to plaintiff to be housed, fed 
lJ,nd.cared fo:r by plaintiff for the remainder of said doO"s 
life, ,at plaintiff's usual rate for housing, feeding and cari~lg 
for such dogS, viz., at the rate of $20.00 per month, which 
said. sum ,said Drucks, promised and agreed to pay" payable 
at the end of each month, and that said dog was neither 
to be sold nor exhibited by plaintiff." On December 30, 1938, 
decedent being ill WaB taken to the hospital. Mike was de-
Nov. ,1942] Ro"Y 1). SALISBUR"Y 
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livered to plaintiff's' kennels, and ever since !laid date has 
b~en kept and cared for by plaintiff according to the terms 
of the contract. Decedent returned to his home on January 
5' 1.939 and died on January 9, 1939:, On December 30, 
1938 Mike's life expectancy was eight years; the rate of 
$20 ~er month applied to that period ?f tim~ equals $1,920. 
Plaintiff's claim against the estate bemg reJected, he. com-
menced this action and judgment was entered therem on 
January 20, 1941, awarding him $480 for the. period from 
De,cember 30, 1938, to December 31, 1940. WIth respect to 
the remainder of Mike's life expectancy the sum of $1,440 
was awarded which was to be paid at the rate of $20 per 
month on ,the last day of each month COllpnencing in J anu-
arY', 1.941, or that defendant executor "pay into court a sum 
of money sufficient to meet the monthly installments of $20.00 
each for the housing, feeding and caring for said dog 'MIKE' 
during the lifetime of said dog, ,a~cru~ng betw.een. the 31st 
daycif December, 1940, an~ the expiratlO~ of ~ald l~fe expec-
tancy of said dog 'MIKE, as found herem, VIZ., eIght years 
after December 31, 1938, or a total of $1,440.00, the sum of 
$20.00 to be paid over to plaintiff on the last day of each and 
every month during the lifetime of said dog 'MIKE< c~m­
mencing with the month of January, 1941, ~ndcon~mumg 
during the lifetime of said dog 'MIKE' untIl the saId su~ 
of $1 440.00 has been fully expended." 
[lj Disregarding conflicts there is sufficie~t evidence to 
support the findings with respect to the eXIstence. of the 
contract. One of plaintiff's employees testified that m June 
or July, 1938, decedent called at plaintiff's kennels and sta~ed 
to plaintiffs: " 'MY' health is failing. In the event anythmg 
shoUld happen to me or I should die, Mike will be brought 
to the kennel and I want him to stay here and be taken care 
of and be fed, not to show him and not to work or not to sell 
- him' and Mr. Roy (plaintiff) said, 'Yes, I will do that.' " 
The'same witness related other conversations in which dece-
dent stated that he wanted to be sure Mike would be cared 
for and a few days after Thanksgiving "The Doctor came 
in and he- was crying. He says, 'I come back from the ceme-
tery.' He said, 'It will be my last visit,' and Mr. Roy said, 
'Doctor, you will be all right, you will get well.' Doctor 
Drucks said, 'I know better. I didn't come here for sympathy 
or charity. It is strictly business,' and he said, 'so the agree-
ment about Mike still stands,' and they shook hands on it." 
Mr. Bollinger testified that decedent had said he was making 
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,arrangements for Mike's carc if he was unable to care for 
him. Mrs. McIntosh testified that the decedeut told her he 
had made arrangements with plaintiff to care for the dog 
"in case the Doctor was unable to take care of him or in the 
event of hiS death." Mr. McIntosh testified substantially to 
the same effect. There is evidence that after decedent had 
purchased' Mike, he had paid $20 per month for his care by 
plaintiff. . . 
[2] With r('gard to the commencement of performance under 
the contract, Mr., Reposc, a friend of decedent, testified that 
the latter told him "if. anything happened, that Roy (plain-
tiff)wQu~sr,¥a.ke' ,care .afthe dog and to take the dog out to 
the keim~ls. :thOre. and, that ROy would look after the dog." 
,~epo.se· oc~~ional1y attc~ded to t4e dog for decedent. / At 
,tqe time decedent.Was taken to the hospital he had been bed-
:l'idden,fol'flvc'days, and Mabel Hanavan, a close friend of 
decedent's who ':w~s . at his home, told Repose to take Mike 
~o-' plaintiff's k~els. ''I'hat was done. Decedent spoke of 
~~'~oga~te~he;,rc~urncd from the hospital, but it appears 
:powhere that. he: requested that Mike be brought home. As 
~ar'~ ~ppea:tS, ~o other arrangement existed between plain-
.tiff arid <iece'dent ,in rep,ard to the taking of Mike· to the ken-
nels or'- for hiscnre.· These circumstances were sufficient to 
Justify theulferencc ,that when Repose delivered the dog to 
,the kennels' iC was in' accordance with decedent's request, 
and was_pursuant to the tcrms of the latter's contract with 
, ~laU:tt?f~ :,',p~,oo.do,nt~s physical condition coupled with his 
. 'rem.ovafto;.'ib,e',~ospital created a situation where he was 
" "AAabl~'t6"c~re":fo'f Mike, arid having madc no other arrange-
. }n.e~~.,~'r~?~~t.)P,~h'c 'care, of the dog, it ma~ be assumed 
; tliatthc' delJyery of the dog ,to the kennels was. m accordance 
, .·1 (~ " :'-, 1 ,d \ -.'":"" ['. , ,.;', • " ••. • 
;.~91;P:~i_~~rc,m?ntw~th plamtlff. It is reason~ble to ~fer 
~~,a~?edf3~t:~~;W ~ewas at the kennels durmg the tlme _ 
,lie' was h9Dl,C' 8,ftcr- rct:urning from the hospital and at the 
time" of hi's . death,inasmuch as he was very much attached 
to the dog;anll' wscussed it during that time. So far as the 
record 'discloses he mnde no comment in regard to Mike's 
absence .. ' .. ' .' 
. . [3] Defeildant urges that the contract was. unenforceable 
'because it was not in writing, and came within the statute 
of' frauds providing that an agreement which by its terms 
Is 'not to be performed dnrillg the lifetime of the promisor 
mUst be in Writing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1973(6) ; Civ. Code, 
§ 1624(6).) In that connection he claims that the contract 
~ 
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contemplated by the parties was one in' which plaintiff was 
to board Mike only in the event of decedent's death and refers 
to evidence that decedent spoke of approaching death in t~c 
'transactions forming the basis for the contrac~. . But It 
should be noted that witness Bollinger, after testlfymg that 
decedent had said that if he were un'able tp care fo: the ddg 
he wanted it cared for at a proper place, also testlfied: Q. 
"When he said tbat you don't know what he (dec~dent) 
was referring to when he said he was unable, whether It was 
sickness, death or going away from hereY A. He was re/er-
ring to his ill health. He didn't !'lay anything a?out expect-
ing to die. He said he was in ill h~alth and making arrange~ 
ments with Mr. Roy if he was unahle to take care of the 
dog." The evidence from several. witnesse~ was to t~e effect 
that the dog was to bo boarded If the decedent was unable 
to care for it or should die. It thus: appears that decede~t 
had two contingencies or alternatives in mind as stated m 
the c~ntract found by the conrt to exist.. namely; that ~e 
dog was' to be boarded by plahitiff if deceden~ should dl~, 
or if he were unable to eare for it b,ecause of Illlless. It IS. 
appropriate to observe at this point also t~at d~fendant con-
tends' that the contract is fatally .uncertam (dlscus.se,d later 
herein). If that be tme then sectIon lfi54 of the. CIVIl Code 
is pertinent. It provides: "In case's of nncertamty not l'e-
moved by the preceding rules, the language of a contract 
should be interpreted most strongly aga1ns~ the. party who 
caused the uncertainty to 'exist. The promlsor IS presumed 
to be such party." . . 
, One of the preceding rules to whiC'.h reference IS made IS 
that "If the terms ot a promiRe arc in any respect ilmbigu-
QUS or uncertain, it must be interpreted in tlJ~ sc~se in which 
the promisor believed, at tIle time of makmg It, tllat the 
promi~ee understood it.". (Civ: Co<ie, §].G49.) l\f~rely ?e-
cause decedent spoke of Impending death m connectIOn WIth 
the transaction does not nnce.'!sarily ef;tabli:;h thnt the con-
'tingency of death only was the selll!e in. which deeede'nt be-
lieved that plaintiff understood .tIle !'fOmlse. We have tb<>re-
fore the contract with the two alternatives as found by the 
court. 
[4] With tbat ill mind we tnrnto ~he issllo of ~he statnte.of 
; frauds. 'rhere arc several rules applIcable to Hns case wInch 
will support the judgment. Conceding that if the sole pro~ 
VISion of the contract was for the care of the dog in the 
event of dec.edent's death, it would be a contract not to be 
• I, I 
I, 
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performed during the lifetime of decedent promisor, and 
:th~refore cond~mn~cl by the statute of frauds (see Hagan v. 
,M,cNary, 170 Cal. 141 [148P. 937, L.R.A. 1915E, 562]) ;··but 
'wehav.e Seen that death was' not the sole alternative. If the 
teJ;'IDs of a contract are such that it admits of performance 
.during the lifetime of the promispr, it is not within the'stat-
utory provision here involved. That conclusion follows by 
analogy from the accepted interpretation of the statute of 
frauds provision that a contral:)t that "by its terms is not 
to be performed within a year" must be in writing. (Code 
Ci:v.Proc., § 1973(1); Civ. Code, § 1624(1).) It is to be 
n.oted that the wordjng of the two provisions is identical ex-
cept as to the period of time involved. An oral contract 
. whi<,lh is capable of being performed within a year is not 
condemned by the statute or; as recently stated by this court 
in Hollywood M. P. Equipment 00. v. Furer, 16 Ca1.2d 184, 
187 [105 P.2d299]: "It is well settled that oral contracts 
invalidated by the statute because not to be performed within 
a year include those only which cannot be performed within 
that period. (~Williston on Contracts, Revised Edi,tion, 
§ 495, p. 1441.) Even though a promise may not by its 
.terms be performed within a year, yet it is not inhibited by 
the stat~te if there is a possibility that it may be .. The con-
tract itsel~ must' contain language whose reasonable interpre~ 
tation shows a cleQ,r intention that it cannot be performed 
within the year. It is subject of proof urlless by its termS 
:it U:J incapable of performance within said period." ". (See, 
also, 12 C:al.Jur. 857.) Manifestly the contract here in ques-
tion could be. performed within the lifetime of decedent. If 
. he became UJ).able to care for Mike during his lifetime; the 
c~ntract would be performable and the perfor:rp.ance might 
be completed before his death because the dog might die be-
fore de<,leden-t, thus requiring no further care and the con-
tract would have been completely performed. It was' stated. 
in Gaskins v. Security-First Nat. Bank, 30 Cal.App.2d 409, 
4]8 [86 P.2d 681], involving a contract with the guardian 
of an iDcompetentto care for the latter's minor children with 
l;'efereuce to.section ·1624(1) : , 
. "It could ,also be said that even assuming the contract 
.'~th the original guardian WIlS Dot in writing, its perform-
:t\1l cc was; not by its terms postponed beyond one year. In 
the case at bar the contract was to care for· the minor chil-
,dren of the incompetent during their minority, with payment 
w,he made. when the youngest attained majority: . Obviously 
Nov. 1942] Roy v. SALISBURY 
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such a contract might be fully performed in one year from 
the date of its execution, as, for instance, would be the case 
should all the minor children have died within the first year." 
(See also 27 C. J.184.) . ' 
[5] However, defeIJ.dant contends that if a portion of an 
oral contract is invalid because within the statute of frauds 
thE) entire contract is unenforceable, Citing Fuller v. Reed, 
38 Cal. 99, and that here the agreement to have the dog cared 
for in the event of decedent's death was ins~parable from the 
term that similar care was to be given if decedent was unable 
tocate for the dog.' That rule cannot have any application here 
because even if the alternatives upon which the dog was 
to be boarded, that is, death or inability' to care for the dog 
are treated as inseparable and indivisible, still the contract 
could be performed during decedent's lifetime. If decedent 
became unable to care for the dog before .his death and it 
was boarded by plaintiff but died befor~ the death of de~ 
cedent, there would be no further performance required, and 
the provision with regard to the contingency in the event 
of death would nevar become operative. Where one part of 
a contract is capable of performance within the time specified, 
and thus not within the statute, and such performance may 
constitute also ~ performance of the other part of the contract 
which is within the statut,e, then the contract may not be 
condemned. Furthermore, where a contract contains two prom" 
ises which are in the alternative, rather than being merely 
divisible, one of which is within the statute of frauds and 
the other not, recovery may be had for a breach of the latter . 
(See Ward v. Ward, 94 Colo. 275 [30 P.2<i853] ; Oanister, 00. 
v. Wood &7 Selick, Inc., 73 F.2d312, certiorari denied, 296 U.s. 
590 [56 S.Ct. 101, 113, 80 L .. Ed. 417]; 25 RC.L. 703; 27 C.J. 
318.) The' cOlltract in question stipulates that "if said Drucks 
ever became unable'to care for said dog, .or, if he should die" 
Mike would be' delivered. to plaintiff for boarding, "for the 
remainder o~ said dog's life." Obviously, the promises were 
in the alternative and jn no event was, th,e contract to extend 
beyond Mike's life.' Decedent's affec~ion for Mike and the 
other circumstances herein narrated i~dicate that he desired 
.that Mike's welfare be saff,lguarded if he wer~un:able to give 
tha;t protection himself. All decedent desired would beac-
complished by said contract if he became unable to (,are for 
the do~ before his d~ath, and that inability continl,led a.s it 
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~d in the iiistant case up to his death and thereafter, as the 
~esult of his~death during the lifetime of the dog. ' 
~(,[6~] ,Defc~dant co~tends that thecontrac~ is~atl!,lJy un-
~am, refcl;"rmg particularly to the clause "If said Dr~ck.s 
~o~d become una}:4e to ca~e for said dog." That positi9Ilis 
upt~nable. ,[7J It is ~Jundam,ental principle as stated in Mo-
l}Z-:rf~iZv. Fraw,leYl!!0tor,Oo., 190 CaL 546!549 [213 P. 971] : 
l,' The law .does not favor but leaus agamst the 'de~tructiori, 
~t c()Iltr~cts because of uncertainty; and it will, if feasible, 
s~:c~nstrlie agre~ments'as to carry into effect the reasonable 
~~ti~ns of'th,ep8.rties i(that call be ascertained.''' (See, 
~o, q~v. qod~;, :§).,65,3 ; Sutliff v. Seidenberg, S. & 00., 132 
(JlU.,63 '[(!4'P: 18~,~69r;Meyers v. Nolan, 18 Citl.App.2d 
~19 [63 P':2,d ,12161; ,Pe~se v. Lindsey, 129, Cal.App. 408[18 
fi~d, !17]i N~~~~:'~. ~~id-Avery ~o., 89 CuLApp. 75, 79, [~64 
f'., ;3411.) Also, /l-dyertmg to sectIOn 1654 of the Civil Code 
..... ,. " . t,.. ., ". . . , 
m" '~ses Of"~nce,rtaiAty n,ot removed by the rules stated in 
?~~tio'nS16~5,t~J6,?,~, ort~at code, the lunguag~ of a contract' 
~ould be~t~rp;t'eted 'l}1ost strongly against the party whQ 
"e~~edthe ,u.U:~~rtaintyto eXist, and the promisor is presumed 
t#be such~aJj;~. ,[6})l:rrom decedent's affection for the dog 
and hisdiscti$sipnof:his illness in connection with the trimsac~' 
tion:, toge'th~r' with the t~stimony of BoUiu'ge:r 'heretofore men:~ 
~orie4'thattbedecedenth!1d illness in mind with reference to th~ 
care of tn.a dQg;the trial court was justified in concludinO' that 
the in/1.bility' contemplated witS physical incapacity~ No; only 
:Was thedec~dent:,bedriddenand in no condition to care for 
the dog, . btit he was taken to the hospital wh~n :Mike was taken 
to t11e kennels: . 
, [8] ,Wehaveheretoforepointed out that the evidence was 
sufficient to estfiblish that Mike was delivered to the kenneis 
un~et" the terms of thecontra<:t. That being true the p,a.:r,tiesby 
th('1r own conduct have placed the interpretation on the contract 
that the illness' of . decedent constituted the iuability therein 
mentiop,ed 'and 'remoVeS any question of uncertainty. The 
construct~on placed upon a contract by the parties is per-
suasive and. the law recognizes that the practical construction 
niade by them is cogent evidence of their intent. (Long Beach 
Drug Co. v. United Drug 00., 13 Ca1.2d 158 [88 P.2d 698, 
89 P.2d 386J.) 
, In conncction with his claimed uncertainty, defendant urges 
that the impounding ·of funds nnder section 953 of the Pro-
b~te Code ,for the payment of immatured or contingent claimS 
Nov. 1942] Roy v; SALISBURY 
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is an equitable, proceeding, that therefore the judginent. here' 
providing for such impounding is in effect requiring specific 
performance of the contract. and that the rul{'s in specifiC' 
performance cases with .respect to uncertainty in contracts are: 
applicable. That reasoning is extremely' doubtful to say the 
least. bl,lt in any event, as we have seen, the contract here is 
not fatally uncertain. 
[9] The contract upon which pl,aintiif's judgment is based 
Was the community property of the plaintiff andbis wife,' 
Elizab,eth. After the contract was made, the dog was deliv-. 
ered to the kennels, and six months ufter decedent's death: 
Elizabeth executed the following instrument: . . . 
" July 8, 1939. In consideration for the sum of ... $1 to 
me in hand paid by my htlsband C. A. Roy, I het,ebyagree 
t.hat t,he claim against the Estate of Ed",ard S. Drucks (No. 
71031. Alameda C/o.) on account of t4~Doberman dog 'Mike' 
alid aU proceeds thereof is the separa,te property of my 
husband, C. A. Roy. (Signed) MR~.ELIZABE,TH ROY. 
Wife'of C. A; Roy." 
At the trial Mrs. Roy testified, over defendant's objection' 
(his motion to strike was also dimied); thatdecedentac., 
quired Mike .from plaintiff and he was trained at the kennels; 
she also testified as to the amount paid for s11ch training, 
and the conversation on which the contract hetweendecedent 
and plaintiff was based.:pefendnntur~es that Mrs. R,oy was 
incompetent as a witness under Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 1880 (3) providing that a person cannot be ~. witnesS who 
is a party or assignor of a party to an action, or' person in 
whose behalf an action IS prosecuted against. an executor 
upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased 
person as to a11Y matter or fact occurring· before the death 
of decedent. It is contended that by vi.rtue of the above 
iustrument, Mrs. Roy was the assignor of her' community 
property interest in the rights under the contract.W e believe 
that the case of Perkins v. S1(,nset Tel. &7 Tel. 00., 155 Cal. 712 
[l03 P. 1901, is controlling on this proposition. There plain-
tiffs, husband flDd wife, prosecuted an action for a personal 
injury to the wife. The court found that plaintiffs had an 
agreement prior to the accrual of the personal injury action 
that all community property then held or thereafter acquired 
would be the wife's separate property and that after the 
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action,had accrued, the husband had relinquished to hi~ Wlfe 
all 'his 'interest in the dllmage action. Defendant contended 
tbatthere could not be an assignment of a cause of action 
for personaHnjuries, to which this court replied at page 720 : 
"'Itis,arllie,unfversallyrecognized that one who is injured 
personally may not assign Ii claim growing out of such tort 
but' there is some authority to the effect that almost every 
other kind of property is assignable. (Rued v.Oooper, i09 
Cal. [682] 693, [34 Pac. 98].) However, the court found ,here 
'not ,1m assignment hut a relinquishment of all the husband's 
ciahp:: to'the;community'property. If such remission as to fur-
flier., accreti9nsbefore the caU$e of action would operate as a 
"transmutatiQ,n of the pr.operty into ,the wife's separate estate, 
'ICe ,see no reason why the same result could not be attained 
py the ,same means after the cause of action came into ex-
istence: It was therefore proper for the court to find with 
reference to 'the agreement which the plaintiffs made after 
~e, accident aIld before February 8, 1906." (Emphasis 
ad~ed;)Wl1:ilethere is rio finding in the instant case that the 
~bove quoted instrument is a relinquishment rather than an 
a~igrunent, ,it, is' readily ,susceptible of that construction 
inasmuch as it states that the chose in action here involved 
"'is thesep~rate property" of plaintiff. It does not purport 
to"beapresent transfer, that is, an assignment. Rather, it is 
'a'recognition of an estab,lished status of the proPerty as sep-
arate'rather than commUnity: Defendant contends that since 
~e amendmeiltl~ 1927 of section 161(a) of the CiVil Code, 
a,Wif(ha,s '~' pre:serit,exi,sting and equal interest in the com-
muni:f;yPfoperty; the cases decided under the former section, 
h,oldingth~t' she 'was, competent as a witness in an action by 
,~er:'1;i1lSband,ori' a community claim against an estate are riot 
p~rtiiient, 'berebecause they were based, upon her lack or a 
preSentin~~estiin the c()m~unity claim. However, the Perkins 
case involved a transfer by it hlisband to his wife of his inter-
,e.\;i'in::su~h ,a ciaim, and unquestionably he had a vested 
~t~li~ti#~fco,mm~typroperty at that time. 
i~::tl0J.But.'even:f.e it be assumed that error was committed in 
P~flnittingher ,totestify,.it was not prejudicial and did not 
'cQDBiit:ilte'a',:o:iiscarrfage' of justice. The evidence heretofore 
~~~d,'~'swpportiIlg: the judgment all came from sources 
qth~~ t~im_¥r~.,:Et0Y. ,Her testimony was merely cumulative, 
~~e' beiJlg ~,d~q1?-ate evidence without it to support the judg-
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rue~t. The case was tried before the court sitting without a 
jury. Defendant saving his objection by stipulation had oppor-
tunity to and did cross-examine Mrs. Roy. It has been held 
that under the proper circumstances where there is sufficient 
independent competent evidence to support the judgment 
without the erroneously admitted testimony of incompetent 
witnesses, such error is not prejudicial. (Evans v. Gibson, 
220 Ca1.476 [31 P.2d 389] ; Mantord v. Ooats, 6 Cal.App.2d 
743 [45 P.2d 395]; Gump v. McPherson, 136 Cal.App. 778 
[29 P.2d 893].) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., and Schauer, J. pro tem., concurred. 
Gibson, C. J.,and Curtis, J., concurred in the judgment 
on the ground stated in the opinion that the admission o.f 
the evidence of the wife, even though erroneous, was not preJ-
udicial. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. Section 1880 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure provides: "The following persons cannot be wit~ 
nesses: ... 3. Parties or assignors 6f parties to an action or 
proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding 
is prosecuted, against an executor Or administrator upon a 
claim, or demand against the estate of a deceased person, as 
to, any matter or fact occurring before the death of such de-
ceased person;" The wisdom of such a statute has been a 
matter of controversy for so long that it may well be time for 
the Legislature to make a re,examination that will freshly 
evaluate the protection of estates .from false clairils and the 
ensuing risk of defeating just claims. (See Wigmore on ~vi­
dence(3d ed~) §§ 578, 1576, 2165.) In any event thesectlOn 
should be amended or repealedoruy by the Legislatu:re. Its 
revision, cannot properly be undertaken by ,the ,court, which 
could resort only to quibbles over words, as it does in the 
present case by labelling the agreement between the husband 
and wife a relinquishment rather than an assignment. 
Perkins v. Sunset Tel. & Te~.,155 Cal. 712 '[103 P. 190], 
upon which the majority opinionrelies,in noway concerned 
section 1880(3) of the Code of Civil 'Procedure. ,Moreover, 
ten years before the cause of action for the injuries to the 
wife arc;>se the husband and :wife agreed that all community 
.. 
MUELLER 11. ELBA OIL CO. [21 C.2d 
'prope~ acquired in the future should be the separate prop~ 
ertY'~f:~~ 'Wite;'andi the reference to the agreement succeed-
ing 'the ca.use of action was therefore dictum unnecessary to 
the'decision.:· . 
.: In the light of all the evidence it is not improbable that a 
differentjildgment ':would have been reached had the er-
rone~Us1Y admitted 'e~dence been excluded. Since the error 
is 'therefore 'prejUdicial 'the judgment should be reversed. 
.. h:::,q(: .f, i "'.' . :;::"'.:' . '; ~ \'., . 
.; ~.Edmonds; J,.;'concurred. 
[S~ F. ~~; 1~772. In Bank. Nov. 2, 1942.J 
D.' J.MUELLER,i i~ppellant, v. ELBA OIL COMPANY (a 
,: Partnership) et aI., Respondents. 
[la, 1b] Bankruptcy-Debts and Assets-Claims-Compromise.-
in, an:invol~lltary. b~h;ruptcy proceeding involving a partner-
ship, an order, pu!\~uant to the trustee's petition to compro-
mise and on ~:qe ,notice, approving the compromise and .ad-
judging the discharge of partners from all liability as general 
plj.l'tne,rs ot the bankrupt. firm, is binding on a general sch~d­
uled creditor who-had not filed a claim before the expiration 
of the· twa therefor, and it operates to relieve the partners 
from their par~nership liability although they had not been 
adjudicated baJllc;upt, .where the offer of compromise was 
made before expiration of the time for filing claims, and where 
the . compromise. proceeding was instituted prior to. the effec-
tive date of the 1938 amendments to the bankruptcy law. (See 
. Bankr. Act, § 27; 11 U.S.C.A. 50.) 
[2a,..2c] ld.-:-Debts and Assets-Claims-Compromise-Law Gov-
. ern~.':"'The 1938 amendments to the bankruptcy law which 
, govern. prooeedings pending on its effective date "so far as 
' .. practicable" (52 State. L. 940, § 6 (b) ; 11 U.S.C.A., 1941 Cum. 
Pocket Pt., un,der§ 1) are inapplicable to a compromise pro-
; "i, • (leeding ; then pending where the offer was made before the 
effective,date.of the amendments and the amendments would 
, . deprive the ,coUrt of jurisdiction to approve the offer of com-
,1 promise' on the terms on which it was made. 
;"i', [lJ See 6 ·.Am:;Jur; 809. 
.'( McK. Dig; References:. [1-6, 10] Bankruptcy, § 12b; [7] Con-
'tracts, §154;' [8] Judgments, § 373; [9] Judgments, § 323. 
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'[Sa-Sc] Id.-2Debts ~nd Assets-ClaimIl-'-CompromlBe:.,...(lollateral 
Attack.-In a bankruptcy proceeding itgaiilst a firm, an order 
on a petition to compromise, whlch adj1l'4ges a discharge of 
partners from all liability 'as such, is ~()t subject to collateral 
attack by reason of ambiguities in the petition, or inconsisten-
cles between the petition and the order made thereon. 
[4] Id.,-Debts and Asset~Claims-Oompromis!l-What Consti-
tutes._In a proceeding in. bankruptcy to marshal assets of 
partners of a bankrupt firn.l, an offer of' a specified amount' to 
satisfy unsecured .creditors with the controlling objective of 
securing a release of the partners did not constitute an at-
tempted composition or arrangemen~ withj.n Bankr. Act,§ 301 
etseq. (11 U.S.C.A. § 701' et seq.),. notwithstll.llding the use 
therein of the term "composition of credtiors"; but it was an 
offer of settlement by way of compromise by persons in the 
positions of defendants in an adversary proceeding. 
[5] Id.-Debts and Assets.,...Claims-Oompromise ....... Acceptance.-
A trustee in bankruptcy has no power to alter conditions con-
tained in an. offer of compromise. The offer must be accepted 
in substantial compliance with the conditions or not at all. 
[6] Id.-Debts and Assets-Claims-Compromise-Controversy.-
The mere fact that a trustee in bankruptcy is entitled to com-
pel partners of a bankrupt firm to marshal their assets does 
not make the fact or amount of net recovery .. for the partner-
ship less controversial so as to preclude a compromise. In de-
terminingthe advisability of compromise, the bankruptcy 
court may consider the uncertainty and cost of litigation, and 
the sufficiency of the petition presented. 
[7] Contracts-Interpretation-Law as Part of Contract.-The 
bankruptcy law as it exists at the time of an offer of comprO:-
mise in connection with a bankruptcy proceeding is as much a 
part of the offer as though .it were written therein . 
[8] Judgments - Res Judicata-Character of Tribunal-Federal 
Court.-A final order of a referee in bankruptcy, impliedly 
approved QY the court, confirming a compromise and discharg-
ing partners from liability as general partners of a bankrupt 
firm, will be given full faith and credit in a state action as 
against the creditor suing a partner on a debt covered by the 
order~ (See Bankr. Act § 1(9); 11 U.S.C.A. § 1(9).) 
[9] Id.-Collateral Attack.....:Errors.-Jurisdiction is but the power 
to hear and determine, and does not depend upon the correct-
ness of the decision made. 
[10] Bankruptcy-Debts and Assets-Claims-Compromise-Col· 
(7]- See 6 Cal.Jur. 310 • 
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